In the early nineties European firms decided to list their equity on the U.S. market besides their own domestic listing, cross-listing their shares. Cross-listings happen when firms list their equity on a foreign exchange in addition to their home listing. Cross-listings are accompanied by costs. For example, European firms that decide to list on U.S. stock exchanges need to adapt new auditing and reporting standards, which increases their auditing fees. Also being listed on more than one exchange imposes listing costs, which are typically fixed and variable during the year. In order to justify these costs firms must make a profit from these listings. Literature on cross-listings typically argue that the benefits of cross-listings can be summarized by the following: Overcoming market segmentation, increased liquidity, reducing the firms’ cost of capital and introducing investor protection through corporate governance, also known as the bonding hypothesis.
Since 2002, many large multinational firms, such as Daimler, ING, Aegon and others deregistered from major stock exchanges. Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that the corporate governance costs were reasons for firms to delist on U.S. stock exchanges. In another paper, Bessler (2012) explain that German firms that delisted from the major U.S. stock exchanges didn’t receive the benefits of these cross-listings and shouldn’t have cross-listed in the first place. The decision to delist was therefore in the best interest of the shareholders. Over the last 15 years financial economist have developed an impressive body of reasons why firms delist. These studies typically relate the decision to the increased costs of cross-listings, but also to firm specific characteristics and changes in the host market. However, the effects of these cross-delistings are largely uncovered.
This study focuses on the price effects of cross-delisting from major U.S. stock exchanges and what triggered those effects. Therefore the research question is: What are the price effects of cross-delistings and what are their drivers? Studying the price effects on cross-delistings will add to the current research as follows: The price effects of delistings show how the investor perceive the cross-delisting announcement. While cross-delistings may be paired with cost savings, it may also unfold certain characteristics about the home market, the firm, the continent and the current state of the economy as a whole explaining why there is a negative or positive price reaction. In other words, studying the price effects of cross-delistings enables us to have a comprehensive understanding in the situation the firms was in during the cross-delisting decision. This is especially important, because the effect of cross-listings are not clear. While some researcher find a valuation gain others do not. Studying the effects delistings of cross-listed may explain why some firms enjoy valuation gains and some do not. Hence, this research may serve as recommendations
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the history of cross-listings, secondary delistings and depository receipts will be explained. This section will cover the conventional wisdom on cross-listings, including their main benefits reported. Then relevant literature on delistings will be covered to understand why so many firms have delisted from major stock exchanges while many scholars argued that these cross-listings should have increased value. Section 3 will cover the methodology and data, section 4 will go through the results and section 5 will go through some final remarks and conclusions.
2. Literature review
This section will go through the relevant literature on cross-listings and delistings. As this research will analyze what the price effects of cross-delistings are from major U.S. stock exchanges, the first section will go through how foreign firms can cross-list their shares on U.S. soil. There are different types of listing in the U.S. and these types of listing have different requirements for the foreign firms. The second part will go through the well-cited benefits of cross-listings documented by scholars. In the third part relevant literature on delisting will be analyzed and hypothesizes are formed.
2.1 Cross listings
This section will go through the relevant literature on cross-listings. Typically scholars have argued that cross listing are accompanied by valuation gains. Scholars argue that cross-listings overcome market segmentation, increase liquidity, reduce the cost of capital and foster investor protection by complying to more strict corporate governance policies in the host market. In this section these main pillars will be explained.
2.1.1 Market segmentation
A firm may choose to cross-list their shares on a second stock exchange in order to reach new investors. According to the market segmentation hypothesis, firms cannot reach other investors as markets are segmented. By cross-listing on other markets firms can reach a wider investor base. According to Merton (1984) investor recognition plays an important role with this matter. Investors have incomplete knowledge of foreign firms and cross-listings mitigates these information asymmetries. By diversifying the investor base, firms can increase the quality of it. Also, more exposure to investors make it easier for firms to sell their shares on equity markets. Baker et al. (2002) analyzed cross-listings on the NYSE and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and find that the number of equity analysts that follow their stock rises with 6.18 on average, which represents an increase of 128%. Also the number of news paper articles being published on in the Wall street Journal and the Financial Times increased significant in the post-listing period. It is apparent that these cross-listings increase the firms’ exposure to investors by having more media attention through analyst and press coverage. Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) report that the increased media attention results in better analyst forecasts and accuracy, which increased firm value. Karoly finds that for firms from cross-listing on U.S. soil from emerging markets were better integrated in world markets after they cross-listed.
Liquidity is the extent that an financial security can be bought or sold without affecting the price. Mostly it depends on the level of trading volume. Liquidity influences returns and prices in two-fold in this analysis. First, it influences expected return as investors demand an premium for holding illiquid stock. Amihun and Mendelson (1986) find that illiquidity is a risk factor, which is priced in the price of a security. As investors are aware of selling a illiquid stock, meaning not being able to sell the stock, they demand a premium for this. Second, liquidity influences the securities price as illiquid shares suppresses the share price when being sold. Pagano et al. (2001) find that liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, has a reverse relationship. Foerster and Karolyi (1998) find that for 52 Canadian firms listing on major U.S. stock exchanges the intraday volume trading increased by 29% and the effective spread decreased by 48 basis points. However a similar study by Noronha et al. (1996) find no evidence of liquidity changes from a sample of U.S. firms listing on the Tokyo and London stock exchanges suggesting that these cross-listings provided no benefits in terms of increased liquidity. Halling et al. (2006) shows that the home market plays an important role in determining the liquidity changes after a cross-listing. A firm residing in an emerging market holding illiquid shares, may benefit from liquid markets. These firms show a strong increase in liquidity after they have been listed on more liquid markets. They find that trading largely moves to these market after listing. Hence, in determining the effects of a delisting it is important to look at the state of the home market exchange. See section 2.3.
2.1.3 Cost of capital
Researchers have shown that cross-listings reduce the cost of capital for firms. The idea is related to the market segmentation hypothesis. The idea is that if a firm is not fully integrated in the international capital markets these firms are more risky as risk comes mostly from the home country. Therefore reducing this country-specific risk by cross-listing will reduce the cost of capital as investors face reduces firm-specific risk (Karolyi, 1998). While this may sound appealing we would expect that firms that have the largest gain from cross-listing, firms from less integrated markets and more diversification potential, to cross-list. However this is not the case. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) find that firms cross-list in markets that are more proximate to theirs. Another explanation for the decrease in the cost of capital is the bonding hypothesis. In the next section I will explain how the bonding hypothesis is one of the explanations scholars use to explain the decrease in the cost of capital.
2.1.4 The bonding hypothesis
Traditionally management of a firm has access to more information than their investors, this information asymmetry leads to agency problems. Managers can use their superior information for their own self-interest possibly destroying shareholder value. This is called the agency problem. Corporate governance policies come into play to ensure that management is focussing on value maximization in the long-run in order to maximize shareholder value. This becomes more important when firms try to attract capital from investors to grow. Firms from countries (or stock exchanges) where corporate governance policies are weak have trouble to find investors as this poses high risk for investors. These investors demand higher risks for holding stock in these securities. For these firms, to find the right investors, a cross listing may be beneficial. Cross listing in markets where corporate governance policies are more strict will help to find the investors. In other words, adhering to strict governance policies will convince investors to invest in these firms. Moreover they will demand a lower return for holding these stocks as they are more protected. This is called the bonding hypothesis. Coffee (1999, 2002), Stulz (1999) and Miller (1999) show that firms cross-listing in the U.S. is linked to more investor protection. Moreover Miller (1999) shows positive announcement day share price reaction to firms filling for a listing on a major stock exchange related to corporate governance. In that vain, Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that firms from poor investor protection countries are more likely to list in the U.S.. Hence, firms from more developed countries (in terms of corporate governance policies) may experience less benefits from bonding than firms from poor investor protection countries. In section 2.3 I will discuss all previously mentioned benefits in light of the current literature on delisting’s.
Raise equity, m&a,
2.2 Overview of theory on voluntary delisting’s
This section will go through the relevant theories on voluntary delisting’s. First the definition of voluntary delisting’s will be defined. Second relevant studies will be reviewed on the price effects of delisting’s. Third, triggers of delisting’s will be reviewed as documented in previous studies. Lastly, the process of delisting in the U.S. will be explained in order to have a full understanding of voluntary delisting’s in the U.S.
2.2.1 Definition of voluntary delisting’s
Firms can decide to delist from stock exchanges after they have been listed on another exchange other than their home market. While there are different reasons to delist, the voluntary delisting is the exact opposite of the choice to cross-list. Das et al. (2004) argues that voluntary delisting’s are the ones after eliminating the involuntary ones. These involuntary delisting’s are related to technical problems or firms that do not meet the listing requirements anymore. For purposes of this research I will use the definition of Doidge et al. (2009), which divided delisting’s in three categories: Voluntary delisting’s, delisting’s due to mergers or acquisitions and delisting’s due to not meeting listing requirements. Doidge et al. (2009) argues that voluntary delisting’s are firms that meet listing requirements and are not influenced by mergers or acquisitions that consequently deregister themselves from exchanges. In order to verify these delisting’s a careful search in Factiva and company press releases will be done.
2.2.2 Price effects of delisting’s
Previous studies have documented positive cross listings premiums at the announcement of the cross listing decision. Conversely, voluntary delisting’s is the exact opposite of a cross listing, so intuitively one might expect that the price reaction to be negative upon announcement. Another perspective stems from the fact the firm may try to maximize value for their investors. While cross listing may induce certain benefits for the firm it also carries costs, such as increased auditing fees, listing costs and other indirect costs related to cross-listings. Hence, the firm may be balance the benefits and the costs of the listing decision and may decide to delist if the net benefits are lower than they desire. Intuitively this decision is in the best efforts for shareholder so one might expect a positive share price reaction.
Utreche-Rangau and Carugeti (2008) and Das et al (2004) study voluntary delistings’s from the Tokyo Stock Exchange by U.S. firms. While Das et al. (2004) finds a negative stock price reaction Utreche-Rangau and Carugeti (2008) argues that the direction of the stock price reaction depends on the information provided in the press releases from the firm. In another, more comprehensive study on European major stock exchange, Wyss (2010) find either a negative or insignificant price reaction upon the announcement of a voluntary delisting from major European stock exchanges.
Studies on the price effects on voluntary delisting from major U.S. stock exchanges are rather incomplete and inconclusive. Witmar (2005) examines foreign delisting’s (voluntary and involuntary) from major U.S. stock exchanges between 1990 and 2003 and find a 6% share price decrease. They also argue that firms that voluntarily delist have smaller decreases in their share price. In a more comprehensive study, using the same definition of voluntary delisting as in this thesis, Doidge et al. (2010) examines voluntary delisting’s between 2002 and 2008 from major U.S. stock exchanges. They find a negative abnormal return in the three-day window upon announcement of the delisting decision. Their results are significant at the 5% level. Therefore I expect the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Cross-delisting’s leads to negative price reactions
2.2.3 Firm characteristics of delisted firms
One of the reasons firms cross-list their share on foreign markets is to raise capital. According to Rajan and Zingales (1996) firms with growth opportunities have greater external financing need. These firms may benefit more from a cross listing than firms that do not have growth opportunities. Aslan and Kumar (2011) argue that firms cross-list to rebalance their equity structure. They find that firms that delisted did not rebalance their equity structure during the timespan of cross-listing indicating that their were not able to attract funds from foreign investors. Champlinsky and Ramchand (2012) find that firms that delisted from the U.S. market were characterized by reduced growth opportunities. Therefore the delisting announcement might signal that firms that delist do not have growth opportunities or are not able to raise capital leading to a negative share price reaction.
Hypothesis 2a: Delisting returns are negatively related to the level of growth opportunities within a firm
Merton (1986) finds that investor recognition plays an important role in whether a capital raising could be successful or not. In other words, cross-listing on foreign markets can spark the interest of foreign investors as they will become more aware of the security. The opposite suggest the firm’s inability to raise capital from the same investors. Indeed Pour and Lasfer (2013) find that the magnitude of the price reaction depends on the level of leverage within a firm.
Hypothesis 2b: Delisting returns are negatively related to the level of leverage
Alternatively agency problems can also drive the price effect of cross-delisting. Pagano et al. (1998) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010) find support that the level of asymmetric information predicts the delisting decision. However Marosi and Massoud (2007) argue that it doesn’t have a significant influence. They argue that during the lifespan of the cross-listing private investors came to the market to extract private benefits from the firm. Consequently these benefits have worn out making them decide to delist from these markets. Hence, the delisting decision may be perceived by investors as signaling information asymmetry and may induce a negative price effect. This is especially true when the firm resides in a home country where corporate governance rules are different than the host market. Extracting private benefits by insiders is harder in countries that have strict corporate governance regulation. Besides private benefits extracted by insiders, behavior of management is also important to account for. In the U.S. firms must report quarterly earnings and estimates. Bad management or bad events can be devastating for the firm or the careers of senior management. Therefore by delisting managers can hide these sorts of events as it so no longer compulsory to disclose company information according to SEC rulings.
Hypothesis 2c: Delisting returns are negatively related to the level of insider ownership
Hypothesis 2d: Delisting returns are negatively related to the level of information asymmetry
Another important firm characteristic to account for is liquidity. Marosi and Massoud (2006) find that firms that deregistered from the SEC in the U.S. are more risky as they do not have to comply to corporate disclosure requirements increasing the bid-ask spread. Another reason why liquidity decreased was the loss of a trading venue. It is important to note that their research is about going private transactions, while this research is concerned about cross-delistings. Hence, while their firms do not trade anymore on major exchanges the firms in my sample continue trading on their home market. Conversely, a well-cited reason for delisting in the press releases of sample firms in this study is the lack or trading on the host exchanges. For example, trading volume of Siemens shares were less than 5 percent on the NYSE stock exchange (Press release, 2013). Liu, Stowe and Hung (2013) find from a sample of delisted firms from the Tokyo stock exchange (TSE) that the low turnover of trading on the TSE predicts the decision to delist. The delisting decision can signal low turnover on the host market to investors. As listing comes with costs, low turnover could be a reason to delist and to save money by reducing costs, which could be perceived positively by investors. Alternatively, investors might see the delisting decision as a loss of a trading venue making the stock less liquid. This is especially true if the portion of volume traded on the host market is high. Indeed,
Hypothesis 2e: Delisting returns are positively related to the level of liquidity in the home market
Hypothesis 2f: Delisting returns are negatively related to the level liquidity in the host market
Another important aspect to analyse is the time dimension. Firms may have come to the market for reasons other than value maximization. Initially, firms may benefitted from these cross listing, but these benefits may have disappeared in a later stage. Moreover, firms may be confronted by policy changes during the life span of their listing. For example, a well-cited reason firms delisted from major U.S. stock exchanges was the Sarbanes-Oxly (SOX) act in 2002. SOX increased the cost of listing in the U.S. significantly. Consequently many non-U.S. firms have terminated their cross listing in the U.S. Champlinsky and Ramchand (2012) argue that firms had some benefits from their cross-listing before SOX, but the net benefits became negative in the post-SOX period. Additionally, as delisting’s became easier with the introduction of the 1h-13 act, many firms have delisted from major U.S. stock exchange (see figure 1). This time dimension has been uncovered in previous research on delisting’s and therefore is also included. I expect the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2g: Delisting returns are positively related to the time period of cross-listing
Table 2: Variables firm specific characeristics
Variables Description Hypothesis Sign
Leverage Total debt/total assets Raising Capital –
Insider ownership Directors’ ownership/outstanding shares Agency problem –
Intangibility Intangible assets/total assets Agency problem –
Stock turnover Volume/outstanding shares Liquidity +
Growth opportunties Tobin’s Q Raising capital –
Time Duration of the cross-listing +
2.2.4 Macro, market and country effects
Cross-listing shares on markets where corporate governance regulation is more strict disciplines firms. This is the basic argument of the bonding hypothesis. As mentioned in section 2.2 firms may do this as investors are willing to invest in these firms if they believe investor protection is in place. Moreover investors demand a lower return for less risky firms as strict corporate governance regulations protect investors. Miller (1999) finds from a sample of 181 firms that dual listed their shares on U.S. market the home market is an important driver of the share price reaction. Firms that reside in emerging markets dual listing their shares in the U.S. experience a stronger share price increase. Karolyi (2006) argues that firms from emerging markets gain more from listing on cross-listing as regulations in their home market are typically inferior to that of the host market. Therefore it is important to control for the state of the home market in order to analyse the price effect of the delisting announcement. Conversely, if corporate governance regulation has evolved in the home market, and firms cross-listed their shares to comply to the same corporate governance regulation, the decision to delist should not matter. Otherwise, if corporate governance regulations are inferior to that of the host market investors may perceive the delisting announcement as bad thing leading to a negative price effect. In other words, if the difference between investor protections is larger between the host and the home market the decision to delist will induce a negative price effect. This gives rise to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: Delisting returns are negatively related to the host market investor protection index
Hypothesis 3b: Delisting returns are positively related to the home market investor investor protection index
Although the investor protection index gives us some insight in how investor interests’ are protected within the host country it is still not comprehensive enough. Siegel (2005) argue that although investor protection laws are in place these might still not be followed in practice. Law enforcement practices may be weak in a country or the level of corruption might be very high making the host country unattractive for foreign investors. A more comprehensive measure would be the rule of law. Indeed Reese and Weisbach (2001) find from a sample of cross-listed securities in the U.S. that the cross-listing premium is positively related to the rule of law within a country. Therefore the following hypothesis is expected:
Hypothesis 4a: Delisting returns are negatively related to the rule of law in the host market
Hypothesis 4b: Delisting returns are positively related to the rule of law in the host market
While the rule of law and investor protection index gives us some insight in the price effect of cross-delisting culture can also play an important role in the price effect of cross-delistings. Sarassian and Schill (2004) argue in a well-cited paper that cultural proximity is an important determinant of where firms will cross-list. Stulz and Williamson (2003) investors prefer to be in a liberal minded country (low cultural index level, see table 3). These economies typically are open and may foster cross-listings. Therefore I expect the following hypothesizes.
Hypothesis 5a: Delisting returns are positively related to the cultural index level of the host country
Hypothesis 5b: Delisting returns are negatively related to the cultural index level of the home country
Finally, in order to isolate the effect of the cross-delisting decision one should control for the the performance of the host and home market. The cross-delisting returns can be driven by momentum traders in the stock markets. Hong and Stein (1999) argue that if information diffuses gradually across the population, price may under-react to it. Momentum traders can trade on this information deficiencies and make profits from these types of trend trading. In this research I will use ratio of the Price to Earnings (P/E) of the host market to that of the home market as a possible explanatory variable of the cross-delisting premium/loss. Therefore I expect the following hypothesizes:
Hypothesis 6: Delisting returns are negatively related to the ratio of the P/E of the host market and the P/E of the home market
Table 3: Macro and market trends (sign is for host market)
Variables Description Hypothesis Sign
Investor Protection Index Minority investor protection level (La Porta et al, 1998) Extent of the difference is inversely related to the price effect –
Rule of Law Rule of Law index (Worldbank) Greater stock integration is positively related to the price effect +
Culture Hofstede Cultural Dimensions A high cultural index in het host country leads to a positive price +
P/E ratio P/E (Host market) / P/E (home market) Extent of the difference is inversely related to the price effect –
2.2.5 Procedure of delisting in the U.S.
By means of depository receipts (DR) they were able to raise capital from investors. A DR is a type of financial security, which trades on a local stock exchange, but originates from foreign publicly listed company. For example, shares of Deutsche Bank on the NYSE are a type of DR, called an American Depository Receipt (ADR). Similarily, shares of ING Bank listed on the Deutsche B??rse are global depository receipts (GDR). These depository receipts enable investors around to world to invest in foreign stock. These depository receipts come are spread around the world in the form of global depository receipts (GDR), such as European Drs and other international DRs. A DR is created when a foreign firms wishes to list on another foreign stock exchange. Before it can list on a stock exchange, these firms have to meet certain requirements that are different for stock exchange around the globe. For example, the NYSE stock exchange has stricter requirements than stock exchanges from emerging markets. For the purpose of this research when I mention a delisting, this means the delisting of a DR, which is listed on an exchange and consequently will delist from that exchange, while maintaining a listing in its domicile market and other markets. As not all depository receipts are listed on exchanges table 1 makes an distinction of ADRs that are exchange listed. In this research delisting from the major U.S. stock exchanges will be analyzed.
Tabel 1: ADR types
Unsponsered ADR N Minimum requirements, no formal agreements with depository bank
Sponsored Level I ADR N Can only be traded at the over the counter market (OTC), firms need to be listed on foreign exchange
Sponsored Level II ADR Y Need to list on U.S. exchange and adhere to accounting standards, no capital raising possibilities
Sponsored Level III ADR Y Need to list on U.S. exchange and adhere to accounting standards. More strict rules than Level II, can raise capital through U.S. markets
3. Methodology and data
Using the CRSP database, delisting’s between 2002 and 2010 are identified using data code 520 – 570 that corresponds to voluntary exchange droppings from NASDAQ, NYSE and the American Exchange (AMEX). The definition of voluntary delisting by Doidge et al (2008) is used, which defines voluntary delisting as firms that were cross listing but consequently deregistered themselves and being no longer obliged to follow specific regulations. For this entire dataset foreign firms are identified using the COMPUSTAT database. Firms that originate from the U.S. are left out of the sample. Consequently for all these firms press releases are checked in order to verify if these firms indeed delisted voluntarily. If there is no press release available a Bloomberg or Reuters search is done. In case of the lack of data these firms will be removed from the sample. This gives a total sample of foreign delisted firms of 125 since 2002 (See Appendix). Table 4 shows an overview of these delisting. The number of delisting’s from the NASDAQ and NYSE is approximately the same with 59 delistings from NASDAQ versus 63 delisting from the NYSE. The companies that originate in France, Germany and London have delisted the most since 2002, respectively with 15, 13 and 15 delisting’s. Most of the delisting’s happened in 2007 with 62 out of 125 delisting’s of the data sample (see figure 1). This is not surprising since the 1h-13 rule was accepted in 2007 making it easier for firms to delist from major U.S. stock exchanges, ultimately deregistering themselves from the SEC.
Table 4: Delistings 2002-2010
Home Exchange AMEX NASDAQ NYSE Total
Athens Stock Exchange 1 1
Australia Stock Exchange 5 2 7
Budapest Stock Exchange 1 1
Euronext Amsterdam 5 3 8
Euronext Brussels 1 1
Euronext Lisbon 1 1
Euronext Paris 6 9 15
Frankfurt Stock Exchange 3 10 13
Helsinki Stock Exchange 3 3
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 1 4 5
Irish Stock Exchange 2 2
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1 1 2
KOSDAQ 1 1
London Stock Exchange 1 6 8 15
Milan Stock Exchange 4 4
Moscow Stock Exchange 1 1
New Zeeland Stock Exchange 2 2
Oslo Stock Exchange 3 1 4
Santiago Stock Exchange 2 2
Singapore Stock Exchange 1 1
Stockholm Stock Exchange 8 8
Swiss Stock Exchange 2 2
Taiwan Stock Exchange 1 1
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 4 2 6
Tokyo Stock Exchange 4 1 5
Toronto Stock Exchange 2 5 5 12
Vienna Stock Exchange 2 2
Total 3 59 63 125
Figure 1: Number of delisting’s per year 2002-2010
4. Results and discussion
6. Reference list
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Appendix A: List of delistings companies
Company name Delisting announcement date Delisting date Host exchange Home exchange
Corus Entertainment 15-07-2010 04-08-2010 NYSE Toronto Stock Exchange
Magyar Telekom 23-06-2010 11-11-2010 NYSE Budapest Stock Exchange
Daimler AG 14-05-2010 04-06-2010 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
OTE org 12-05-2010 04-06-2010 NYSE Athens Stock Exchange
British Sky Broadcasting Group 30-04-2010 19-05-2010 NYSE London Stock Exchange
Deutsche Telekom 21-04-2010 18-06-2010 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
AXA 25-01-2010 25-03-2010 NYSE Euronext Paris
Rostelekom 11-12-2009 31-12-2009 NYSE Moscow Stock Exchange
Fairfax Financial 19-11-2009 09-12-2009 NYSE Toronto Stock Exchange
Intertape Polymer Group 12-11-2009 02-12-2009 NYSE Toronto Stock Exchange
Elron Electronics Inds 12-11-2009 06-01-2010 NASDAQ Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Evotec 10-11-2009 27-11-2009 NASDAQ Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Allianz 22-09-2009 23-10-2009 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Pharmaxis 13-07-2009 22-07-2009 NASDAQ Australian Stock Exchange
Santos 30-06-2009 30-07-2009 NASDAQ Australian Stock Exchange
Chemgenex Pharmaceuticals 29-06-2009 08-07-2009 NASDAQ Australian Stock Exchange
Madeco 24-06-2009 24-07-2009 NYSE Santiago Stock Exchange
Telkom 22-06-2009 26-08-2009 NYSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange
TDK Corp 07-04-2009 24-04-2009 NYSE Tokyo Stock Exchange
Infineon Technologies 03-04-2009 23-04-2009 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Lundin Mining Corp 13-03-2009 01-04-2009 NYSE Toronto Stock Exchange
Daiei 24-12-2008 08-01-2009 NASDAQ Tokyo Stock Exchange
Dassault Systems 31-07-2008 15-10-2008 NASDAQ Euronext Paris
Imperial Tobacco Group 24-07-2008 11-09-2008 NYSE London Stock Exchange
APT Satellite Holdings 17-07-2008 06-08-2008 NYSE HongKong Stock Exchange
Head 10-03-2008 28-03-2008 NYSE Vienna Stock Exchange
Delta Galil Industries 04-03-2008 26-03-2008 NASDAQ Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Masisa 20-02-2008 12-03-2008 NYSE Santiago Stock Exchange
Asia Satellite Telecom 08-01-2008 25-01-2008 NYSE HongKong Stock Exchange
Koninklijke KPN 17-12-2007 03-04-2008 NYSE Euronext Amsterdam
Wolseley 11-12-2007 28-12-2007 NYSE London Stock Exchange
Stora Enso 07-12-2007 28-12-2007 NYSE Helsinki Stock Exchange
Enel 29-11-2007 19-12-2007 NYSE Milan Stock Exchange
Air France – KLM 22-11-2007 06-02-2008 NYSE Euronext Paris
Epcos 07-11-2007 29-11-2007 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Upm-Kymenne 30-10-2007 05-12-2007 NYSE Helsinki Stock Exchange
Macronix International 21-09-2007 26-10-2007 NASDAQ Taiwan Stock Exchange
Benetton Group 12-09-2007 18-10-2007 NYSE Milan Stock Exchange
Publicis Groupe 07-09-2007 26-09-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
Bayer 06-09-2007 26-09-2007 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology 30-08-2007 03-10-2007 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Koninklijke Ahold 30-08-2007 19-09-2007 NYSE Euronext Amsterdam
Suez 29-08-2007 19-09-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
E.ON 21-08-2007 07-09-2007 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Fiat 03-08-2007 22-08-2007 NYSE Milan Stock Exchange
Rhodia 31-07-2007 27-09-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
Basf 30-07-2007 06-09-2006 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Metso 26-07-2007 14-09-2007 NYSE Helsinki Stock exchange
Technip Coflexip 25-07-2007 15-08-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
Akzo Nobel 24-07-2007 25-08-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Amsterdam
Swisscom 06-07-2007 30-08-2007 NYSE Swiss Stock Exchange
Tokio Marine Holdings 05-07-2007 25-07-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Amsterdam
Brilliance China Automotive 05-07-2007 25-07-2007 NYSE HongKong Stock Exchange
Atlas South Sea Pearl 29-06-2007 20-07-2007 NASDAQ Australian Stock Exchange
Ciba Holding 26-06-2007 19-07-2007 NYSE Swiss Stock Exchange
Australia & New Zealand Bank 20-06-2007 11-07-2007 NYSE Australian Stock Exchange
OCE 19-06-2007 28-06-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Amsterdam
Volvo 14-06-2007 12-12-2007 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Creative Technology 14-06-2007 31-08-2007 NASDAQ Singapore Stock Exchange
SK Broadband 08-06-2007 27-06-2007 NASDAQ KOSDAQ
Sodexo 30-05-2007 13-07-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
United Utilities Group 30-05-2007 22-06-2007 NYSE London Stock Exchange
ICI – Imperial Chemicals Industries 29-05-2007 15-06-2007 NYSE London Stock Exchange
Meldex International 29-05-2007 15-06-2007 NASDAQ London Stock Exchange
SGL Carbon 25-05-2007 22-06-2007 NYSE Frankfurt Stock Exchange
TNT 25-05-2007 16-06-2007 NYSE Euronext Amsterdam
Spirent Communications 25-05-2007 13-06-2007 NYSE London Stock Exchange
Telenor 22-05-2007 08-06-2007 NASDAQ Oslo Stock Exchange
PGS – Petroleum Geo-Services 18-05-2007 19-07-2007 NYSE Oslo Stock Exchange
EDP – Energias de Portugal 18-05-2007 07-06-2007 NYSE Euronext Lissabon
Naspers 17-05-2007 07-06-2007 NASDAQ Johannesburg Stock Exchange
Arcadis 16-05-2007 07-06-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Amsterdam
I-Cable Communications 15-05-2007 07-06-2007 NASDAQ HongKong Stock Exchange
Koor Industries 14-05-2007 16-06-2007 NYSE Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Ducati Motor Holding 14-05-2007 13-06-2007 NYSE Milan Stock Exchange
Genesys 11-05-2007 30-05-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Paris
National Australia Bank 10-05-2007 15-06-2007 NYSE Australian Stock Exchange
Skyepharma 04-05-2007 11-05-2007 NASDAQ London Stock Exchange
Amcor 02-05-2007 13-06-2007 NASDAQ Australian Stock Exchange
Bunzl 01-05-2007 01-06-2007 NYSE London Stock Exchange
PCCW 27-04-2007 17-05-2007 NYSE HongKong Stock Exchange
Danone 26-04-2007 03-07-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
Trend Micro 26-04-2007 30-05-2007 NASDAQ Tokyo Stock Exchange
British Airways 25-04-2007 17-05-2007 NYSE London Stock Exchange
Vernalis 24-04-2007 03-05-2007 NASDAQ London Stock Exchange
Telekom Austria 24-04-2007 16-05-2007 NYSE Vienna Stock Exchange
Stolt Nielson 19-04-2007 21-05-2007 NASDAQ Oslo Stock Exchange
Scor 03-04-2007 13-06-2007 NYSE Euronext Paris
Dorel Industries 07-03-2007 16-03-2007 NASDAQ Toronto Stock Exchange
Dectron Internationale 28-02-2007 14-03-2007 NASDAQ Toronto Stock Exchange
Infovista 09-02-2007 20-02-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Paris
Besi – BE Semiconductor 13-12-2006 05-01-2007 NASDAQ Euronext Amsterdam
Bennett Environmental 22-11-2006 13-12-2006 AMEX Toronto Stock Exchange
Icos Vision System 26-10-2006 15-11-2006 NASDAQ Euronext Brussels
Acambis 12-09-2006 18-12-2006 NASDAQ London Stock Exchange
Sanyo Electric 30-08-2006 31-10-2006 NASDAQ Tokyo Stock Exchange
FNX Mining 23-05-2005 12-06-2006 AMEX Toronto Stock Exchange
Datamirror 01-11-2005 04-11-2005 NASDAQ Toronto Stock Exchange
Transgene 21-09-2005 23-09-2005 NASDAQ Euronext Paris
Robogroup Tek 08-09-2005 07-12-2005 NASDAQ Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Wescast Industries 16-06-2005 30-06-2005 NASDAQ Toronto Stock Exchange
Electrolux 15-02-2005 31-03-2005 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Autonomy Corp 18-11-2004 16-12-2004 NASDAQ London Stock Exchange
Baran Group 25-06-2004 08-07-2004 NASDAQ Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Teliasonera 10-06-2004 06-08-2004 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Vero Software 23-04-2004 29-04-2004 AMEX London Stock Exchange
Biacore International 25-02-2004 20-05-2004 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Boardwalk Real Estate Trust 09-01-2004 20-02-2004 NYSE Toronto Stock Exchange
MTG – Modern Times Group 17-12-2003 31-12-2003 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Metro International 11-12-2003 23-12-2003 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Intershop Communications 30-10-2003 17-02-2004 NASDAQ Frankfurt Stock Exchange
E Marchitown 22-08-2003 21-11-2003 NASDAQ Tokyo Stock Exchange
Transcom Worldwide 14-05-2003 29-05-2003 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Liquidation World 29-04-2003 30-04-2003 NASDAQ Toronto Stock Exchange
Kinnevik 14-03-2003 21-03-2003 NASDAQ Stockholm Stock Exchange
Trader Classified Media 18-12-2002 18-12-2002 NASDAQ Euronext Paris
Fisher & Paykel Healthcare 05-12-2002 27-02-2003 NASDAQ New Zealand Stock Exchange
Regus 06-11-2002 07-11-2002 NASDAQ London Stock Exchange
LVMH 10-10-2002 18-10-2002 NASDAQ Euronext Paris
Riverdeep Group 01-10-2002 03-10-2002 NASDAQ Irish Stock Exchange
Toll NZ 08-06-2002 31-07-2002 NASDAQ New Zealand Stock Exchange
Nera 30-04-2002 29-05-2002 NASDAQ Oslo Stock Exchange
Datalex 14-04-2002 25-04-2002 NASDAQ Irish Stock Exchange
Electrochemical Industries 19-03-2002 16-04-2002 NYSE Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
QSC 25-02-2002 02-04-2002 NASDAQ Frankfurt Stock Exchange